1. Introduction

After the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Egyptian foreign policy began to shift as a result of the change in Egypt's leadership from President Gamal Abdel-Nasser to Anwar Sadat and the emerging peace process between Egypt and Israel. Sadat realized that reaching a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a precondition for Egyptian development. To achieve this goal, Sadat ventured to enhance US-Egyptian relations to foster a peace process with Israel. He worked hard to change the Egyptian domestic, regional and international environment in a way conductive to peace and to closer ties with the US. Sadat expelled Soviet advisors in July 1972 and in November 1973, one month after the 1973 war, Egypt and the United States restored diplomatic relations. Since then, the two countries shared in a peace searching marathon to settle the Egyptian-Israeli conflict that culminated in Sadat's historical trip to Jerusalem in November 1977.

As a result, the US endorsed Sadat' peace initiative and assisted in the Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations at Camp David in September 1978 and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in March 1979. The US then organized a peacekeeping regime along the Egyptian-Israeli borders, the Multi-National Force and Observers (MFO), in which the US maintains a rotating infantry battalion. During the 1990s, the two countries worked to promote bilateral relations, foster military cooperation, maintain regional stability and enhance peace in the Middle East. Indeed, military cooperation, commercial trade ties, and close diplomatic coordination on regional and international issues, remain the cornerstones of the bilateral relations between the US and Egypt.

Military cooperation between the US and Egypt is probably the strongest aspect of their strategic partnership. General Anthony Zinni the former Commandant of the US Central Command (CENTCOM) once said, Egypt is the most important country in my area of responsibility because of the access it gives me to the region. Egypt was also described during the Clinton Administration as the most prominent player in the Arab world and a key US ally in the Middle East. US military assistance to Egypt was considered part of the administration's strategy to maintaining continued availability of Persian Gulf energy resources and to secure the Suez Canal, which serves both as an important international oil route and as critical route for US warships transiting to the Gulf. Defense cooperation between Egypt and the US was demonstrated in Egypt's military participation in the 1991 liberation of Kuwait and in joint military exercises over the past decade. Between 1979 and 2003, the US has provided Egypt with about $30 billion in military aid making Egypt the second largest recipient of US military aid after Israel. Also, Egypt received about $30 billion in economic aid within the same time frame.
Despite differences and periods of friction in relations between the two countries, the US-Egyptian relations under Mubarak have evolved moving beyond the Middle East peace process towards an independent bilateral friendship. It was in the US interest that Egypt was able to present moderate voice in Arab councils and persuade other Arab states to join the peace process and to normalize their relations with the US. However lately Egyptian-American relations have become a little tense. This is due to a great extent to the Egyptian unwillingness to send troops to Afghanistan and Iraq in peace stabilization missions. Egypt strongly backed the US in its war against international terrorism after the 11th of September attacks, but refused to send troops to Afghanistan neither during the war nor after it. Egypt also opposed US military intervention of March 2003 in Iraq, continued to oppose US occupation of the country after the war and further refused to comply with US requests to send troops to the country even under a UN umbrella.

The issue of participation in the post-war construction efforts in Iraq has been controversial in Egypt and in the Arab world as a whole. Opponents see that the war was illegal and it is necessary to wait until Iraq has legal representative government to deal with it. On the other hand supporters of participation argued that the responsibility to protect Iraqis and to help them in time of crisis should prevail and guide the Egyptian action in Iraq.

Despite the Egyptian unabated enthusiasm to encourage Palestinians and Israelis to come back to the negotiation table and restore momentum to the American Road Map plan, it was clear that such efforts were not sufficient to compensate for the Egyptian absence from Iraq and Afghanistan where more than thirty countries have established a military and civilian presence. Accordingly, based on a Pentagon announcement the Bright Star joint military exercise scheduled for October and November 2003 in Egypt was cancelled because of continued operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The cancellation of Bright Star while other military programs continued between the US and other countries in the region gave the impression that US-Egyptian relations were tense. In addition, Egypt fell under American press criticism for ignoring American interests in the region and neglecting its position as a country that receives $2 billion a year in aid, primarily because Egyptian endorsement and participation in the war on Iraq and post-war stabilization were far below American expectations.

The Egyptian defense policy have been frequently criticized by some American analysts. On one hand they don't encourage supplying Egypt with modern aircraft and ammunitions that make Israel feels threatened, and on the other hand view the Egyptian armed forces as still largely saddled with obsolete equipment and an inflexible organization and doctrine. Accordingly, there have been repeated calls for downsizing of Egyptian military, reallocating of resources, as well as reshaping organization. They also differ with the current Egyptian spending priorities. In their view, Egyptian military spending should focus on improving the living standard of military personnel, stressing interoperability with US and other allied western military, and concentrating military purchase on land forces, communication equipments, lift and logistical assets. Other different ideas encourage building strong and modern Egyptian military which can participate in operations alongside or as a substitute for American forces to combat regional instability and to protect common interest.

The purpose of this paper is to draw a picture of the US-Egyptian military cooperation and to ask questions about its effectiveness and the factors influencing its development in the future. The paper also considers the fundamental changes in the Middle East security environment and the impact of these changes on the content and extent of military cooperation between the two countries. The military relationship between the US and Egypt is strong and extremely strategically beneficial for both of them, yet not entirely smooth as hoped by the two countries. In view of strategic changes unfolding in the Middle East, rebuilding of a new common vision for the relation is timely and essential for its future enhancement.

2. US-Egyptian military cooperation Record

As a result of the Camp David peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979, the US forged a close relation with Egypt. American and Egyptian military forces began to train together regularly giving US units exposure to Middle Eastern conditions and Egyptian units exposure to advanced military assets and methods. The US provides Egypt with weapon systems, joint training, military advice, expertise, lift, logistical support and command assistance. In return, the US armed forces depend on Egypt for access to the Middle East and wide-range support in projecting American power into the region and beyond. In many situations, Egypt committed its military to support US foreign policy initiatives. Egypt sent troops to Morocco to help King Hassan II in the war against Algeria in 1979, to oppose Libyan operations in Sudan in 1983, to defend Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries in 1992, and to stabilize the situation in Bosnia in 1994. Egypt's military not only participated in the US organized intervention in Somalia in 1992-1993, they also opened their ports and air bases to the operation. The CENTCOM essentially ran the entire logistical operation for the Somalia mission from Egypt. During the 1997 crisis between China and Taiwan, Egypt's ready cooperation allowed Washington to rush a carrier from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, freeing the carrier on station to advance to the Straits of Taiwan.

Egypt was the second largest military contingent to the defense of the Gulf countries (30,000 troops) and provided the necessary political cover for hosting US and other coalition troops on the territories of the Gulf countries during the war. During Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, American aircraft flew 200,000 sorties across Egypt to the Gulf. When Iraq threatened Kuwait again in October 1994, Egypt's expeditious approval for the deployment of a carrier battle group through the Suez Canal sent a critical signal to Baghdad. The US relies on Egypt for quick transit of military assets to and from the Gulf region. The US routinely conducts 500 military over-flights each month. Although Egypt has a formal policy denying transit through the Suez Canal to nuclear-powered ships, it routinely waives this regulation for American warships.

Despite the formal opposition of Egypt to the US-led military intervention of March 2003 in Iraq and its calls for a diplomatic solution to the crisis, its contribution to the war efforts was quite significant. Egypt offered important logistical assistance during the war. Most importantly for the American operations in the Gulf was the short notice transit of the American vessels in the Suez Canal that Egypt granted before and during the war with all associated security and logistical arrangements. When the Turkish Parliament denied US troops the use of Turkish bases to open a northern front against Iraq, the US warships in a very short notice was able to pass to the eastern front in the Gulf through the Suez Canal. Compared to other western and Middle Eastern allies of the US, including NATO members, Egypt was crucial for the success of the US military action in Iraq.

US-American cooperation over the years also included a large number of joint military exercises. The United States and Egypt conducted the first Bright Star joint military exercise in August 1983 and continued ever since to hold it periodically for infantry, airborne, artillery, and armored forces. The Bright Star held in October-November 1997 included military contingents from the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, France, Kuwait, and Italy. A total of 63,000 troops from 11 nations participated in the Bright Star exercise held in October-November 1999, and 70,000 troops from 11 nations participated in Bright Star 2001 from 7 to 31 October 2001. Egyptian and US military officers stated that cooperation in Bright Star exercises facilitated US-Egyptian cooperation and military compatibility in Desert Storm, and served as precedent for future US-Egyptian cooperative ventures. Bright Star exercises were widely covered on front pages by all first line newspapers and magazines in Egypt. The coverage emphasized the regional character of the event, and provided the public with interesting military news and human and personal information of the commanders, officers, and soldiers (e.g. stories about women's role in the American military, service conditions, historical background of the participating battalions and regiments, etc.).

On another front, US interest in a military base in Egypt followed the renewed interest in a Rapid Deployment Force mainly designed to protect the Gulf. In 1981, Egypt agreed to allow the US use of Ras Banas if an Arab state was threatened, but the negotiation collapsed because of disagreements over managing the facility. However, based on an unconfirmed understanding, Egypt will most likely allow the US access to military facilities in time of crisis after mutual discussions and agreement. An Egyptian contingent has been designated to serve with the Gulf Cooperation Council armed forces.

The issue of defending the Gulf region against the threat of ballistic missiles was high on the American-Egyptian agenda during the period 1997-2000. The Clinton administration had proposed to the GCC and Egypt to join the US in developing an area-defense system against ballistic missiles. So far, the Gulf States and Egypt have shown little enthusiasm for such project because of technical and financial problems.

US military cooperation has helped Egypt modernize its armed forces. Under FMS programs, the US provided Egypt with F-4 jet aircraft, F-16 jet fighters, M-60A3 and M1A1 tanks, armored personnel carriers, Apache helicopters, antiaircraft missile batteries, aerial surveillance aircraft, and other equipment. Both Egypt and the US enjoy tremendous diplomatic and military benefits from their military cooperation and close ties. Through cooperation with the US, Egyptian contribution to the stability of the Middle East has been manifested in many different aspects including deploying forces in the area, supplying defense equipments and ammunition, protecting strategic sea lines and organizing joint training and exercises.

Egypt strongly backed the US in its war against international terrorism, but refused to send troops to Afghanistan in stabilization mission. On the other hand, despite Egyptian opposition to the American war on Iraq, Egypt allowed US to use the Suez Canal and Egyptian airspace. Concerning participation in peacekeeping operations in post-war Iraq, President Bush called at Sharm-el-Sheikh summit in June 2003 upon Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia to send troops to Iraq as part of an international force to maintain security in Iraqi towns. Egypt however appeared unwilling to comply with the American request and President Mubarak declared that Egypt would not send troops to Iraq even under a UN umbrella. King Abdullah II of Jordan agreed on condition that other Arab countries also contribute to the peacekeeping force, and Saudi Arabia asked for delay to respond to the American request.

About $60 billion in US aid has flown into Egypt since 1978, contributing to a thorough modernization of the Egyptian armed forces, as well as supporting a vast array of programs ranging from agricultural improvements to industrialization and support for infrastructure construction. In addition to Foreign Military Financing (FMS) purchases and excess defense articles, Egypt co-produces the US M1A1 Abrams tanks. Egypt also repairs and overhauls different types of military equipment and proposed contracting for depot level maintenance and repairs for NATO and US armored forces and some cargo aircraft.

Ultimately, the historical sequence of events in the region during the last three decades indicated that Egypt through guarding and promoting its own national interests has served and protected western interests in the region and succeeded in major strategic confrontations and turning points to preserve the order and stability in the region. By expelling the Soviets from Egypt and practically from the whole Middle East (1975) the naval balance in the Mediterranean was permanently skewed in favor of the US, NATO and the West. The visit of Sadat's to Israel was the beginning of an era of peace making and conflict resolution in the area (1977). In addition to stemming the Iranian revolutionary thrust by backing Iraq in the 1st Gulf War (1980-1988) and protecting the Gulf from Saddam Hussein's expansionist policy and fighting with the US and the west countries in operation Desert Storm (1991) to protect order and common interests in the region (Israel was asked to remain out of the coalition and not to participate in the war).

3. US-Egyptian cooperation in a new Middle East

In the post-September 11, and after the two wars of Afghanistan and Iraq, any potential US-Egyptian military cooperation will take place in a very different Middle East. Security-wise, a new Middle East is currently in the making and is different from the old one of the 1990's in four main aspects:

1) Geography

Traditionally the Middle East has been defined as extending from Morocco and Mauritania on the Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf countries on the Persian Gulf. Based on that definition the Middle East includes Arab countries members of the Arab League plus three non-Arab countries: Turkey, Iran and Israel. This system is surrounded by 3 important security boundaries namely the US, the European Union and NATO. Those three actors while having no direct geographical boundaries with the countries of the Middle East are actively influencing the security of the region. During the 1990s, security interactions between the system (the Middle East) and its security boundaries have been managed through several security mechanisms such as bilateral cooperation (case of the US), security dialogue and confidence building (case of NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, and case of EU's Security Charter within the framework of the Barcelona Process).

After September 11th, and the wars on Afghanistan and Iraq, the geography of the Middle East has expanded eastward extending all the way to the Philippines and Indonesia. The defining measures here are the types of security concerns, the nature of the threats posed, and the dimensions of the theater in which major operations are conducted. The Geographical setting of any security system is a key determinant factor in planning, training, command and control, strategic transport, and intelligence operations. Geography can also dictate new types of missions and operations. For example within the new geographical framework any Egyptian military cooperation role with the US would have to take into consideration that Egyptian troops might be stationed in Afghanistan or that Egyptian vessels may be required to operate in the Indian Ocean.

2) Mechanisms of change

In the new Middle East, surgical, interventionist, pre-emptive mechanism of change will replace - at least for a decade ahead - the past Clintonian mechanism based on dialogue, peace treaties, confidence-building and economic incentives. If Geography refers to space, mechanisms of change refer to the time factor of the process. It relates also to efficiency, cost and possible side effects. While the interventionist approach raises ethical, legal and political implications it also dictates a regional and international responsibility of rebuilding and reconstruction. Moreover, the experience of the wars on Iraq and Afghanistan has shown symptoms of change in the right direction and in fast pace than before (for example the Emirates' Initiative calling Saddam to step down before the war; the Saudi reform initiative; plans for reforming the Arab League; social, democratic and human rights reforms in Egypt, the democratic reforms in Bahrain, Qatar and Oman, signing the special protocols with Iran, the Libyan initiative to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, the Sudanese peace process,..). In spite of that, the recent experience in Iraq shows a fundamental lack of awareness of the culture of intervention on the levels of governments, the media and civil society in the region. This was particularly clear in the absence of mechanisms for regional crisis management in peacemaking, rescue operations and reconstruction. As new geography will shape the domain and content of action of any Egyptian potential cooperation role in the Middle East, new mechanisms of change would affect the responsiveness and quality of this role. This result has no relation with the US' administration ideology or US hegemony and its heavy-handed approach, as much as it is related to the nature of threats posed and to the complexity and uncertainty of the mission.

3) Change of system boundaries

One of the important results of the wars on Iraq and Afghanistan is that the security boundaries of the 1990's are no longer boundaries acting from outside the system, but are now part of the system i.e. they are now physically in the system and it is expected that they will stay that way for a long time. The US, most of the EU countries, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Singapore and others now have troops and weapon systems in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, and The Horn of Africa. NATO moved for the first time from its area of responsibility in Europe to Afghanistan and currently provides support for Polish troops in Iraq. The implications of such changes on the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue are not yet known, neither is there a clear picture on the possibilities of enhancing the dialogue to practical cooperation on the ground. In addition to that, the current reshuffling of mission priorities worldwide is expected to favor fighting terrorism and WMD proliferation. Again the Egyptian role must consider that dialogue while necessary it is not now sufficient, more important is cooperation and true partnership and with plenty of new partners. Bright Star exercises, for example, should be redesigned to cope with the new actors existing in the area.

4) Dilemmas of Balance of Power and Balance of Values

The security dilemma in the Middle East is expected to exacerbate because of the huge imbalance of power caused by the American military presence and the un-even acquisition of nuclear weapons, missiles and advanced armament in the region. More important is the current process of attempting to drastically change the value system in the region to fit western models. This process is likely to generate security stresses that may fuel even more terrorism. Fortunately, President Bush has expressed in many occasions his awareness of the nature of difficulties expected to face the countries of the region in the phase of transformation. He called particularly Egypt to lead changes in the region and to provide a model in democracy, modern education, human rights, and free economy. Finally, dealing with the cultural factor of security and the problem of advancing new values, the mission will require crafting proper operational concepts and cooperation strategies between Egypt, the US and the rest of other countries in the region.



4. Factors affecting US-Egyptian Military Cooperation

1) Absence of common vision


US-Egyptian military cooperation now faces a vision and credibility gap in addition to a lot of confusion in concepts and terminology particularly after September 11 and the wars on Afghanistan and Iraq. The ongoing processes in Afghanistan and Iraq are described differently by the two countries. The US call its presence in Iraq liberation while Egypt calls it occupation. Compared to the Gulf war of 1991 where both countries had common goals, Egypt and the US have no common meaning of victory for the current ongoing process in Afghanistan and Iraq. The positive changes in Afghanistan and Iraq, whatever limited or large, as a result of the US-led military intervention are not perceived or even understood by the Egyptian partner. People in the Middle East do not understand what the US is trying to do in Iraq or Afghanistan regardless of how noble or righteous the Americans think that these endeavors are. The analogous process of change unfolding in eastern Europe covering education, justice, democracy, religion, human rights, pattern of cooperation and integration with neighbors and the rest of the world is very far from discussion arenas in the Middle East. Compared to Poland, Rumania or Bulgaria there is no country -with the except may be of Israel- that strives to join NATO or the EU.

1) Differences in regional and international issues

Despite the inherent interdependence in US-Egyptian relationship, the relation was not without friction and strains. This was due to growing differences between Washington and Cairo on a range of regional and international foreign policy issues like those related to Libya, Iraq, Sudan, WMD and ballistic missiles proliferation. In the Iraqi case for example, Egypt was in favor of rehabilitating Iraq and lifting the sanctions altogether while the US was determined to topple Saddam Hussein and remove his regime. In the Libyan issue, Egypt's position was to deflect Western criticism of Libyan WMD and push along with the Arab League to have the Lockerbie case resolved along the lines of the Libyan proposals. In case of Sudan, while the US was trying to remove the government there, Egypt pursued a policy of engagement hoping to reform Sudan without causing the State to fragment.

Mubarak has always been against using force to change other countries' regime: no country has the right to change the regime of another sovereign state, while the new US policy of regime change goes in direct contrast with this notion. Egypt also opposed the indefinite extension of the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1996 unless it is universally accepted - thus forcing Israel to surrender its nuclear arsenal considered by Egypt as great threat to its national security - despite strong American support for the treaty extension.
Egypt's style of charting for itself somewhat independent line from the US mean stream was described by some American analysts as Cairo's Gaulist foreign policy analogous to France's way of finding its proper role in the world in pursuing a foreign policy independent of the US. Regarding this issue, what matter most for Egypt is its credibility in the Arab world. Without a high level of credibility it will be difficult for Egypt to serve its own interests in the region or that of the US.

2) The Middle East peace process

On many occasions related to the Arabs-Israeli peace process, Egypt and the US found themselves in opposite positions. The firm American commitment to support Israel politically and militarily in all situations ultimately constrain Egypt' ability to cooperate openly with the US in all maters. Negative US voting in the UN Security Council on the issue of removing Arafat, construction of the separation wall by Israel and many other issues sensitive to the Arab public inflame anti-American sentiments and render effective military and diplomatic cooperation with the US extremely difficult. Without doubt, enhancing military cooperation between Egypt and the US will be much easier if there was a settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

3) Impact of the Israeli threat perceptions

Moreover, Israeli exaggerated threat perceptions have led Israel to frequently pressure the US to reduce its military aid to Egypt and to limit modernization of the Egyptian armed forces. The Israeli Government has gone so far as to urge the Pentagon not to sell certain weapons and ammunition to Egypt. Israelis are concerned that the sale of advanced US weapons to Egypt sets a precedent in the region that may allow other countries like Russia, China, North Korea, etc., to sell advanced weapons to Syria, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, or Iran. To pressure the US, the Israelis argue that introduction of smart munitions into the Middle East such as the AMRAAM air-to-air missile, the TOW-2b anti-tank missile, the Mk-48 torpedo and other weapons could force Israel to drastically upgrade its forces and find counter to those advanced weapons.

A clear example of this issue is the Harpoon missile sale to Egypt. In November 2001, the US State Department provided a preliminary notification to Congress for a proposed sale of 53 Harpoon Block 2 missiles to Egypt. Israeli security officials attempted to dissuade the Americans from following through the planned sale. They considered the satellite-guided missile as disastrous to Israel's national security and suggested that the sale be postponed until the situation in the region becomes more stable. Under the Israeli pressure the US reached a compromise to restrict the Harpoon missile system ability to hit ground targets. Israel not only tried to block the Harpoon sale to Egypt but tried to benefit from the situation and presented a plan in May 2002, to upgrade jointly the AGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship cruise missile used by the Israeli Navy.

Some American analysts believe that the Egyptian-Israeli problems have a profound impact on the US-Egyptian military relationship. They view the cold peace between Egypt and Israel and the impact it has on Israeli security concerns is behind many problems in the US-Egyptians strategic partnership. Poor relations between Egypt and Israel - in their view - prompt the Israelis to lobby with the US government against certain forms of military assistance to Egypt.

4) Impact of Egyptian threat perceptions

Even after the 1979 peace treaty between the two countries, Egyptian fears of Israel remained. The fact of the Israeli superiority in conventional and nuclear weapons combined with the various military constraints on the Sinai Peninsula, have rendered Egyptian security hostage to any Israeli change of mind. Any Egyptian government is also obliged to guarantee that waters of the Nile flowing from the South are not threatened. In addition, and since the 1970s and 1980s, the growing interdependence of Egypt and the Gulf region has made the stability of the Gulf a national security interest for Egypt.

These three dimensions of Egypt's national security strategy demonstrate a clear need for Egyptian power-projection capabilities. Egypt needs a power-projection capability to help defend the Gulf and enforce the stability of the region either in conjunction with US forces or, in some cases, as a substitute for them. Modernization of the Egyptian military is a necessity to work with the US and to be able to execute properly a large array of missions. To protect sea-lines of communications and carry out missions in the Gulf, Egypt needs to modernize its sea and air transport capabilities and its submarine fleet.

Continuous American and Western supply of advanced military technology to Israel is troubling to Egypt. On a daily bases Israel demonstrates its precision attack capabilities against the Palestinians and from time to time against the Syrians. In any large scale war the prime target for Israel will become the launch facilities, missile depots and critical infrastructure elements. Israel with its new Dolphin-class submarine fleet could project power to larger distances and in different directions. Also the Extension of Israeli capabilities to outer space is strong addition to Israel's power dimensions. In 1997 a joint venture Israeli-US Satellite Company (ImageSat International) was established to build a satellite constellation of eight small satellites based on the Ofec technology. The ground resolution of each satellite will be around 1.5 meters, which means the ability of identifying military valued objects. The first satellite of the series Eros-1 was launched successfully in 5 December 2000.

Today, Israel is enjoying transfer of sensitive technologies from the two superpowers of the Cold War era. It has worked to bring key scientists out of the former Soviet Union to participate in several weapons and space technology programs. In addition to that, It has also succeeded in enhancing its strategic ties with the US and to remove many red lines facing this relation. In March 2000, Israel and the US signed an energy cooperation accord that gives Israeli scientists access to US Department of Energy laboratories. The accord will increase cooperation between the two countries in 25 civilian nuclear and non-nuclear areas.

In addition to funding and technologically assisting Israel in developing the Arrow-2 anti-ballistic missile system, the Pentagon and the US Congress have agreed to assist Boeing Co. in establishing US-based production line for the Arrow-2 missile, violating Category 2 of the MTCR's Equipment and Technology assets. The US-Israeli Tactical High-Energy Laser anti-missile system (THEL) is another example of the two countries advanced development projects. Israel is also seeking US assistance to build high-flying unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) that could find and destroy tactical ballistic missile launchers.

Unfortunately, Egypt does not enjoy the same level of benefits from the US in research and technology transfer as Israel enjoys. Examples of US-Egyptian co-production of military equipment are very limited compared to Israel.



6. Enhancing Egyptian Contribution in the Security of the Gulf

The security of the Gulf occupies an important place in the US-Egyptian military and security cooperation framework. The majority of options suggested by analysts for Gulf security after the fall of Saddam Hussein and regime change in Iraq view the United States as the only credible and acceptable stabilizing force for the Gulf region at least on the short and medium run. Other options see a security role for Europe in the Gulf beside the US as the dominant player. Europe in this scenario could help in the issue of governance such as free market reforms, institution building, modernized education, an active media, and the rule of law. The Arab and Islamic countries like Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan, and Morocco are also invited to increase their potential contribution to Gulf security. The US could consider the option of restructuring the US-Egyptian military assistance program to emphasize the capability to deploy a significant Egyptian force in case of a regional crisis. This includes refocusing the biennial Bright Star joint exercise to serve this purpose.

Egypt could have a multi-tier approach to strengthen the security of the Gulf. This can be done through contributing in GCC collective security arrangements and supplying armament produced in Egypt in addition to organizing training programs. More importantly, it is now the time to reshape Bright Star and to increase its membership. More countries from the Gulf should join, countries like Turkey, Iran, Syria and Israel should gradually share in the training based on political developments in the region.

Fighting terrorism will be a central element in the regional security strategy with great emphasis on the Gulf region. There are obvious connections between the US strategy towards Iraq, the global war on terrorism, US military presence in the Gulf, and the Middle East peace process. Egypt can assume an important role in fighting energy terrorism directed to the energy infrastructure in the region. The vulnerability of vital shipping lanes makes the threat of energy terrorism a very real one in the Middle East. As a result, any coordinated terrorist attack on the energy facilities of the region would cause serious disruption to global energy trade and the world economy. The maritime environment is now being viewed as a viable alternative setting for staging of mass causality attacks and several new concerns have been highlighted, including the use of container ships to smuggle nuclear and radiological weapons into target countries.
Egypt has a good record in disaster relief and humanitarian response missions. One of the missions exercised in 'Bright Star 97' was an Egyptian-UK rescue operation for a large-scale earthquake disaster in the city of Alexandria, with losses assumed to reach 10,000 inhabitants. Experience gained was demonstrated during the earthquake tragedy in Turkey in 1999, where Egypt and other countries from the Middle East provided help and assistance. The Egyptian Armed Forces' medical and engineering teams stayed in Turkey several months after the disaster.

The Iraqi post-war reconstruction experience has demonstrated the importance of deploying a civil rapid response capacity to fill the gaps between military and civilian organizations in the areas of immediate post-conflict assistance. Such assistance is vital for reconstruction to begin.

Humanitarian de-mining has become an integral part of peace operation and peace building. Egyptian Corps of Engineers contributed in demining operations in Kuwait after the Gulf War of 1991. In addition to being dangerous, mines also present an obstacle to the economic development of entire areas. Mine action could develop as an important field of technology cooperation and solidarity in the Middle East and in the Gulf region.

Peacekeeping operations are likely to be a major and fruitful area for mutual cooperation and confidence building. In addition to training activities, cooperation in peacekeeping may be extended to joint force planning, creation of regional peacekeeping modules, and military participation in disaster relief and humanitarian emergency response missions. Egypt conducted a large number of peacekeeping missions in Africa, Asia and Europe.

Egypt also could contribute in joint media operations with other partners in the Gulf and the Middle East. Arab countries in general have an edge in the area of television satellite channels, an important facility to be used for fostering cultural, economic and democratic reforms.

Looking to the Middle East as a wide theater for action, it is essential to network its countries. Re-building advanced transportation, energy and information networks on the regional level are vital for security and the promotion of a regional spirit. In this regard Egypt works on networking electricity and natural gas with its neighbors Jordan and Syria; the project is also expected to extend to other countries in the region. The Nile waters are now flowing through four tunnels under the Suez Canal in El-Salam Canal (Canal of Peace). Two new bridges were constructed over the Suez Canal for Cars and railway transportation.

Conclusions and Recommendations

In order to enhance US-Egyptian relations, the US and Egypt should start a deep revision and assessment of their military and security relations in view of the strategic changes unfolding in the Middle East. Drawing a mutually understood strategic vision for the region in addition to re-defining roles and interests of basic actors will have a paramount impact on military and security cooperation between the two countries.

It is also equally important for Egypt to become actively engaged in both Afghanistan and Iraq with the United States and other partners from inside and outside the region to turn both Afghanistan and Iraq to success stories. This will be in the benefit and interest of the whole Middle East and the world at large.

It is without a doubt that one of the main boulders obstructing better US-Egyptian military relations is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Enhancement of US-Egyptian military cooperation will be much easier and effective with the settlement of the of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Without settlement of this conflict the cost of cooperation will be higher and the potential for enhancement will be limited.

Regardless of criticisms and pressure, the US should continue helping Egypt build a modern military effective and ready to cooperate in combating regional instability. A modern Egyptian military is needed to carry out a large array of missions in the Middle East. To protect sea-lines of communications and to carry-out missions in the Gulf, Egypt will need to modernize its sea and air transport capabilities and its submarine fleet. The modernization of the Egyptian military will not only serve Egyptian interests but US interests as well.

In addition, the enhancement of regular exercises like Bright Star in missions and membership will help strengthen interoperability between the countries of the region and the US. Bright Star has proven to be very beneficial in the past not only in training purposes but also in developing understanding and strong military-to-military relations.

In view of the recent strategic changes in the Middle-East namely, regime change in Iraq, the Iranian signing of the IEAA protocol, and the development in the Libyan WMD case, the US should develop a more comprehensive vision in regards to military assistance and technology transfer. The US should not only take into considerations the security threat perception of Israel, but of all the countries in the region.

Finally It is important to say that in order to enhance US-Egyptian military relations, the two countries have to learn how to work together in an entirely different Middle East; different in geography, in security boundaries, in mechanisms of change and in the nature of its security dilemmas, This new Middle East presents as much opportunities as it presents drawbacks and for a successful and unstrained relationship between the two allies in the future they must together understand this new system, but more importantly understand each other in its new context.


Maj.Gen (ret.), Dr. Mohamed Kadry Said
Military & Technology Advisor
Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic
Studies, Al-Galaa Street, 11511, Cairo
EGYPT
Tel (w): (202)770 5630
Fax: (202) 5786037
e-mail: mkadry@ahram.org.eg