In the immediate aftermath of declaring Ahmadinejad's victory in the Iranian presidential election with 63 per cent of the votes - against 34 percent for his main rival Mir Hussein Mousavi- people poured into the streets in the largest wave of protest since the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. As demonstrations between Mousavi's supporters and police forces developed into a bloody showdown, observers pose a host of questions on the future of the Iranian regime.
Yet one could say that the national consensus over the regime's constants, particularly the velayet-e faqih- whose principles are very much in contradiction with those of liberal democracy- is far from being undermined. Furthermore, Iranians from across the religious as well as ethnic spectrum converged on the state's foreign policy agenda as set by Ali Khamenei, the supreme guide. Indeed, foreign policy represented a common factor in the platforms articulated by the four presidential candidates. Protests staged by Mousavi's supporters reflected neither an orientation to break with the velayet-e faqih nor a keen interest in genuine democratic reforms - i.e. regime change. These are rather a manifestation of the fiery opposition to Ahmadinejad focusing on the nuclear programme to the detriment of the economic crisis.
Nor it was possible for those who responded to Mousavi's calls - to take to the streets- to provide him with the support necessary for a probable standoff with the supreme guide. In fact, Mousavi is too weak to survive a confrontation with a regime whose supreme guide maintains his grip on power and enjoys an overwhelming support among the military and security forces. As for the clergy, although some of them did not celebrate the triumph of Ahmadinejad, they followed the supreme guide's position that the election saw a very high turnout and the following violent protests were a product of foreign powers. It was clear, therefore, that none of the regime's pillars was ready to go through a confrontation with Khamenei or his loyal militarised security apparatuses, especially the Basij and Revolutionary Guard -whose chief warned Mousavi's supporters that a velvet revolution against Ahmadinejad would result in catastrophic repercussions as the state would then use the maximum force at hand.
It could be said that ex President Mohamed Khatami's stance in support of Ahmadinejad was not so helpful compared with the support provided by Hashemi Rafsanjani, the chairman of the Expediency Council of the Regime and Assembly of Experts -the body that selects the supreme guide and has the constitutional right to dismiss him. Hence the supreme guide's determination to attract Rafsanjani into his camp or at least neutralise him through stick and carrot. At the time when his children were banned from leaving the country on the grounds that they took part in inciting the protestors, Khamenei was heaping praise on Rafsanjani -at the Friday prayer- as one of the pivotal figures of the Iranian revolution and velayet-e faqih.
Since Ahmadinejad was declared the Iranian president elect, Mousavi has issued four statements. The first called upon the supreme guide to order a revote. Yet it fell on deaf ears. The second statement urged the Iranian public to rise in protest of the election results, a move that further infuriated the supreme guide. The third addressed the Shia Marjaaia in Qom, but these were clearly unwilling to challenge the supreme guide. Lacking any leverage, Mousavi published on his website a statement lashing out against the supreme guide and accusing him of placing the entire system of velayet-e faqih in jeopardy. It seems that Mousavi realised that by reaching out to Rafsanjani, Khamenei was planning to strip him of his main ally- similar to what happened in the past with Abu Hassan Bani-Sadr and Ayatollah Montazari. In this context came Mousavi's call for his supporters to stage a general strike should the authorities arrest him.
Anyhow, it remains too early to claim that Iran has experienced the development of a genuine reformist current-to use the words of Mousavi's allies, for it is difficult to trace radical difference within the state's upper echelons. Members of the political elite are chosen after thorough investigation by state apparatuses -including Expediency Council of the Regime and Guardian Council of the Constitution- to guarantee that none of them would dare to swim against the tide and challenge the supreme guide, the leader of the conservative wing.
Khamenei, for his part, moved swiftly to contain the situation. He declared the victory of Ahmadinejad, dismissed accusations of electoral fraud, and accused foreign powers of plotting to destabilise the country. He asserted that unlike the situation in Georgia a few years ago, the Iranian case reflects minor difference in viewpoints among members of the political elite. He ruled out, therefore, the possibility of a Western-backed coloured revolution. In a bid to appease the infuriated pubic and stand up against foreign pressures, the Guardian Council of the Constitution ordered a recount of 10 per cent of votes in the presence of candidates' representatives.
As for possibilities of foreign interference, they remain minor. There is no room for a move similar to the US-backed coup d'etat against Mosaddeq in 1953. The Obama's administration is fully aware of absence of a reliable alternative to the current regime in Iran. In response to Ahmadinejad's electoral victory and the following protests, the US expressed its willingness to go on with the engagement with Iran. Thus the US House of Representatives' decision in support of the Iranian demonstrators was merely a move to save face before the advocates of democracy and human rights inside the US - for the decision lacked a mechanism to put it into effect.
In light of the above, prospects of a radical change in the structure of the Iranian regime remain limited in the short-term. The future depends on the development of a nucleus of enlightened Iranian elite that would serve as an impetus for change. Through sincere effort, accurate calculations and strong belief in the historical role assigned to it, this elite could lead the masses in the struggle to liberate their country from the current degenerate theocratic regime.
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