The International Criminal Court's (ICC) arrest warrant indicting Sudanese President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir for crimes against humanity placed the Arab countries in a difficult situation. Indeed, they are left with two options: to abide by international conventions or defend the sovereignty of the Sudanese regime. The Arab summit— due to be held in Doha by the end of March— cannot afford overlooking the new development, as Arab signatories of the 1998 Rome Charter (Jordan, Djibouti, Comoros, and Mauritania) are obliged to hand over Al-Bashir to the ICC once he sets food on their territories. As UN members, Arab countries are expected to receive a request from the Security Council (SC)–which played a crucial in role referring the case to the ICC—asking them to cooperate.
As for the Arab League, it has to pursue a diplomatic solution to defend the dignity of a member state whose leader was subject to a humiliating treatment. The fact that the indictment could have negative repercussions on the unity of Sudan—which now encounters a host of crises— obliges the Doha Summit to find a way out.
The deep crisis of the Arab regional system expressed itself in many occasions. Over the past years, such system proved helpless in addressing the crises that faced Sudan one after another. Most initiatives aimed at reaching a peaceful settlement came from outside the Arab world. And when Arab League adopted an initiative to put an end to the Darfur war, it lacked the mechanisms necessary to be put into effect. When the African Union (AU) tried to move in parallel with Arab League's efforts, it found many stumbling blocks on the way.
On the international front, the Arab-African team failed to persuade influential foreign powers to adopt a less rigid stance vis-à-vis Al-Bashir and accept a compromise warding off the spectre of the ICC intervention. The efforts the team exerted to convince members of SC to apply article 16 of the Roma Charter –authorising the SC to suspend the arrest warrant for a year—were fruitless. The memo of understanding reached in Doha between the Sudanese regime and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) has gone with the wind following the latest escalation on the part of the JEM.
When the Sudanese domestic scene is concerned, Arab countries— collectively and individually alike—failed to bridge the gab between the government and Darfur rebel factions and pave the way for a settlement that would have aborted the interference by the ICC. In fact, such failure had much to do with the inflexibility displayed by Khartoum. It showed no willingness to give concession over the distribution of power and wealth between the central government and Darfur –similar to the experience of the south. Instead, the government organised demonstrations to show the surge in Al-Bashir's popularity while persisted in the claim that the whole episode is part of a wider conspiracy against the Sudanese regime. The intransigence displayed by most Darfur rebel factions turned the Arab efforts much more difficult. In fact, they saw in the arrest warrant an opportunity to raise their ceiling of expectations. The involvement of new players further complicated the situation. At the end, the Sudanese government appeared rigid and reluctant to cooperate with the ideas seeking to use political tools to find a way out. For instance, Khartoum declined to respond to Egypt's call for holding an international conference, although such a step could have embarrassed foreign powers antagonising the Sudanese president. It seems that the Sudanese regime treated that crisis as a ploy targeting its very existence. Thus there was room for resorting to political or legal means to find an outlet.
Three tactics
Since the issuance of the arrest warrant on 4 March 2004, one could trace three phases in Sudan's handling of the crisis. First, the regime announced that it does not recognise the ICC and used a harsh-worded discourse questioning the court's impartiality. Organising rallies in support of Al-Bashir worked in tandem with this policy. Then there was the forcible expulsion of 13 foreign aid agencies on the grounds that they collaborate with the ICC against the interests of Sudan. Al-Bashir threatened to evacuate all those who infringe on the Sudanese law.
In the second phase the defiant tone receded while the ICC showed persistence to target Al-Bashir. Moreover, the ICC prosecutor hinted that he might file an appeal to charge Al-Bashir with genocide. Khartoum, for its part, started to mend fences with some factions and an agreement with five Darfuri rebel groups was signed in Libya as a result.
Khartoum decided to reopen the investigation into crimes allegedly committed by Ahmed Haroun, State's Minister for humanitarian affairs wanted by the ICC for war crimes in Darfur. The government plans to form a list containing 176 suspects of crimes against humanity. Ibrahim Nemr, the general prosecutor in charge of investigating war crimes in Darfur, announced that Haroun and Ali Kushayb –senior commander of the Janjaweed militias—atop his agenda.
The Sudanese government stated that the committee formed by the Ministry of Justice listened to 257 witnesses, 12 of whom have been arrested.
The third stage was characterised by an inclination on the part of the Sudanese regime to cope with international realities and employ all available means to overcome the obstacles. Five delegations were formed to tour the globe to promote Sudan's stance and rally support behind its ruling regime. Such an attitude implies that the Sudanese government has become fully aware of how serious the situation is. These efforts might enable Sudan to benefit from article 16 to suspend the arrest warrant for a year. One of these newly-formed delegations is expected to head to Russia and China soon in the hope that they could push in this direction. Influential as they may be, the two countries might support Arab and African efforts aiming to contain the crisis, and stand up to calls for declaring Darfur a no fly zone and treating the Sudanese regime in accordance with chapter seven of the UN Charter. The failure on the part of the SC to issue a resolution asking Sudan to reverse its previous decision expelling 13 foreign aid agencies offers a glimmer of hope that efforts to contain the crisis might bear fruit at the end.
Options before Doha Summit
If Al-Bashir is to be tried before the ICC, the unity of Sudan will be placed in jeopardy, particularly as southern Sudan is supposed to undergo a self-determination referendum in two years. Hence the Arab national security has become at stake and Arab diplomacy is now of crucial importance.
In this context, the Doha Summit will face major challenges, while it will have two alternatives at hand. First, concluding an immediate settlement based upon the warring parties offering mutual concessions. Yet such a settlement should be formulated within the framework of a comprehensive outlook on how to achieve everlasting peace in Sudan. Diplomatic and financial support is critical if this option is to be chosen.
Secondly, the summit could convey a stern message saying that the Arabs have become tired of double standards. Then Arab countries should work with Third World countries to rally support behind Sudan and rein in the SC and prevent the issuance of any resolution targeting Sudan
