The uncovering of a Hizbullah cell in Egypt arouses a host of questions regarding the group's principles, strategies and external relations. Indeed, the incident signifies the plight Hizbullah is now suffering on both home and external fronts. The problematic relationship with the Lebanese State and the group's pursuit to use the Palestinian issue to enhance the leverage of particular regional powers pose difficult challenges.

The move to form a cell in Egypt -led by Sami Shehab and including Egyptians and Arabs- implies that Hizbullah decided to stretch beyond the Lebanese borders and play a direct role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict- in full coordination with the Iranian objectives. Central to Hizbullah's new policy were the Palestinian factions intent on continuing its course of military confrontation with Israel. Hamas is at the heart of this camp-the movement took over the Gaza Strip in June 2007 and insists on acting independently from the Palestinian Authority.

Stretching across the Arab world
The current phase could be considered the fourth in Hizbullah's course of work. In the first stage, the focus was on the Israeli occupation forces in south Lebanon. Hizbullah then received direct military support from Iran and Lebanon. The popularity of Hizbullah's leader Hassan Nasrallah across the Arab world was built up in this phase, which reached its climax with the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon in 2000.

In the immediate aftermath of the departure of occupation forces, Hizbullah turned its attention to the domestic arena while keeping its military forces independent from the State. It took part in legislative elections and had ministers in the cabinet. Meanwhile, Hizbullah was determined not to disarm on the grounds that its military forces were there to protect the Lebanese territories in the face of Israeli threats, especially as Shaba farms were still under the Israeli occupation. But Hizbullah vowed not to use its forces to settle internal disputes.

Yet the duality between Hizbullah's political and military role was inevitable. The group emerged as a leading force that has a big say in the country's politics. At the same time, it occupied a unique position due to its military arm that was little known in terms of magnitude and components. Hence the Lebanese State faced the dilemma of who should take war decisions. Be that as it may, such duality persisted given the balance of power at home and the ongoing foreign interference.

One could mention two remarks in this respect. First, some Lebanese forces with strong ties with Syria and Iran supported this situation however contradictory to the constitution it is. The argument was that Hizbullah's forces serve a role of deterrence particularly when the impotence of the Lebanese army is taken into account. Second, the Syrian military presence in Lebanon backed Hizbullah's militias' unconstitutional status.

Yet the withdrawal of the Syrian troops from Lebanon following the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Al-Hariri in February 2005 left its imprint on the political arena. As for Hizbullah, it employed its regional and domestic alliances to preserve the status quo. Over the period from autumn 2005 to summer 2006, forces from across the political spectrum engaged in a dialogue that covered a plethora of issues including the fate of Hizbullah's arms. It proved difficult, however, to strip Hizbullah of its military arsenal or even integrate its forces into the Lebanese army.

A new dilemma
In summer 2006, Hizbullah captured a couple of Israeli soldiers across the southern borders. The Hebrew State retaliated with an all out war that ended by UN Security Council resolution 1701 which forced Hizbullah to drive its troops north of the Letani River (35 km away from the borders) and implied the deployment of the Lebanese army along with UN peace-keepers in the south. Hizbullah then was confronted with a new challenge since its deterrent role was paralysed. Despite the heavy losses Hizbullah inflicted on Israel, it should be borne in mind that its reckless move to capture the Israeli soldiers was the trigger of the war that sustained grave human and material losses and created a deep rift in Arab ranks.

The domestic front
The ultimate result was that Hizbullah's arms turned out to be a heavy burden on Lebanon. Hence strong voices on both domestic and external fronts were raised to demand the group's disarmament. Yet after a short time, Hizbullah managed to restore and upgrade its military capabilities and turned its gun on the home front to settle accounts with its rivals. This development signified the third phase in Hizbullah's policy. Meanwhile, it managed to compel its opponents to concede a veto-wielding third in a national unity government along with other concessions to satisfy its allies-particularly the leader of the Free Patriotic Movement Michel Aoun.

Identifying with Iranian objectives
The assassination of its military commander Imad Mughniyeh while in Damascus despite the extensive security precautions was alarming to Hizbullah. The incident showed that Hizbullah has been infiltrated though nobody knows to what extent. In light of the fact that Iran is the main provider of military and financial support to Hizbullah, the latter was placed under the command of Al-Quds force of the Iranian Republican Guards-whose role extends over the Arab region. The logical outcome for Hizbullah was to stretch across the Arab world and use the Palestinian question to justify such move.

Hizbullah found it impossible to retaliate to the assassination of Mughniyeh given the UN security Resolution 1701. It therefore formed a unit specified to work in countries surrounding Israel. Among its members was Sami Shehab who was assigned to form a cell in Egypt. Primarily, the cell was supposed to target Israelis in Sinai, though tactics where changed later to focus on providing logistic support to the Palestinians in Gaza-to use the words of Nasrallah.

Exposure of Hizbullah
The limited options left to Hizbullah led it to use the Palestinian situation and the ongoing siege of Gaza to interfere directly in the issue via an Arab country: Egypt.

Yet the uncovering of Hizbullah cell aborted these plans and placed Hizbullah before its responsibilities.

First and foremost, what could be approved in Lebanon might not be acceptable in Egypt -which has no place for militias and cannot compromise its sovereignty under any pretext whatsoever. On the other hand, Hizbullah's claims that Egypt is using the incident to regain the regional role it lost to Iran and Turkey displays an unawareness of the standing of Egypt and its leading role in the region. If Egypt was as weak as Hizbullah claims, why would the latter exert such a huge effort-via a host of Arab mediators- to close the file? It seems that Hizbullah's attitude has much to do with the fear that the trial of suspects would disclose information and secrets that might undermine the prestige of Hizbulah in Lebanon and across the region. In any case, the issue is now in the hands of the Judiciary and each party should bear responsibility for its acts.

*Assistant manager of Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.