Piracy off Somali shores remains a problem difficult to deal with despite the passing of international resolutions and moves by some countries to send naval vessels into the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden to combat piracy. Countries concerned with the issue adopted different approaches vis-à-vis crisis. Seemingly, there is a consensus that the problem should be resolved as soon as possible. Yet efforts on the ground prove modest if the magnitude of the problem is taken into account. Up to the moment, the international community has fallen short of finding a solution with a semblance of success.
As for Egypt, it has sustained direct repercussions as a result of piracy which endangers Egyptian vessels and impacts negatively on shipping through the Suez Canal. Equally important however are the negative ramifications on Egypt's national security. Thus the whole situation requires swift actions on the part to Egypt so as to preserve its interests. Cairo could move in cooperation with other countries or international organisations with which it shares worries over the security of the region, or it could act unilaterally if collective action proves wasteful or unworthy.
Problem's dimensions
A plethora of factors have worked simultaneously to create the phenomenon of Somali piracy. Egypt is among a handful of nations concerned by the problem's different dimensions. The following are the factors Egypt is guided by in its pursuit of a solution:
Economically: safeguarding shipping through the Red Sea and nearby areas is an Egyptian top priority. Piracy could lead to the diminishing of revenues gained by Egyptian coffers off the Suez Canal, which make up one of the largest income sources for Egypt -side by side with remittances by Egyptian expatriates and tourism revenues. Any fall in this respect would result in negative consequences regarding foreign currency reserves, budget deficit, public spending...etc.
Causes behind the declining Suez Canal revenues since December 2004 have to be investigated. The question that begs an answer is whether such decline is due to piracy or it is just a by-product of the world economic crisis. Anyway, it is doubtless that the revenues generated by Suez Canal fell consistently in the fourth quarter of 2008 (from $ 469.6 m in September to $ 467.5 m in October, to $ 419.8 m in November.
According to experts, revenues will dramatically decrease should the problem of piracy lasts unresolved. Shipping companies are now considering the alternative route of the Cape of Good Hope. Although the latter is more costly and has climatic difficulties when compared to Suez Canal/Red Sea route, shipping companies could resort to this option to guarantee the safety of their ships. The Danish AP Moller shifted 50 of its vessels to the Cape of Good Hope, and another company reportedly followed suit. The Norwegian Frontline, responsible for shipping large quantities of Middle Eastern oil, is now contemplating a similar decision.
Ransom payments demanded by pirates are no less disturbing. If an Egyptian ship is hijacked, its owner -whether a State-owned or private enterprise-might have to pay millions in ransom. This would imply heavier economic burdens on Egypt.
Strategically: if pirates off Somali shores go unchecked, they might be able to prevent the conduct of shipping and navigation in the Gulf of Aden and southern Babel-Mandeb altogether. Moreover, they could work to broaden their sphere of influence to cover areas closer to Egypt, either near to Babel-Mandeb or even in the Red Sea. This situation could lead to military confrontations between pirates and maritime forces belonging to countries overlooking the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The security of the whole region will be placed in jeopardy, therefore.
Symbolically: Egypt's status in the region will have much to do with the future of piracy in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden. If the problem is to be resolved, Egypt's influence in the region will be enhanced, and the opposite could be said should efforts fail to combat piracy. The relevance of this factor will be realised if countries overlooking the Red Sea succeed to find a formula for regional cooperation. Then the weight of each member state will depend on the strategic leverage it enjoys.
In light of what have been said, Egyptian politics is now shouldered with heavy burdens to find a way out of the piracy problem.
Egyptian responses: realities and hopes
On could offer the following comments on the Egyptian position vis-à-vis the piracy problem:
First and foremost, Egypt was lagging behind in responding to the threat of piracy. The problem emerged many years ago, but Egypt did not move before 2008, when an Egyptian ship was hijacked, even though the period from January to November 2008 witnessed 80 piracy incidents. When Cairo was calling for a consultative meeting among Arab countries overlooking the Red Sea, other countries had already sent their naval forces to patrol the international waters off Somalia's shores to protect ships from piracy.
The Egyptian stance lacked decisiveness regarding the use of naval forces against pirates. In certain occasions Cairo expressed readiness to interfere militarily while in others it called for a collective action under the UN umbrella.
In general, the Egyptian discourse was preoccupied with quelling domestic fears and assuring the public that the piracy problem does not affect Egypt- as piracy operations do not occur inside Egypt's waters. Indeed, such an argument reflects a short-sighted perspective regarding national security. Moreover, it proves inadequate and unrealistic because an Egyptian vessel was actually hijacked and Egyptian authorities had to pay a ransom to free it.
Yet one has to acknowledge that Egypt is aware of the core of the piracy problem: the collapse of the Somali State and disintegration of its territories. Cairo therefore has intensified its attempts to promote Somali reconciliation.
Finally, it could be argued that the Egyptian approach a propos of the piracy problem proved inefficient and failed to suggest initiatives to meet the challenge. Hence Egypt has to reconsider the policies it adopts in handling piracy. The starting point here is to redefine the problem so as to be aware of its magnitude. For instance, Egypt could have opened channels of communication with Somali factions controlling the areas where piracy groups reside, including the province of Ponteland which performs as a launching pad for piracy operations. Egypt had a good chance to interact with Somali factions there particularly as Ethiopian troops left the region. In general, Egyptian strategic decision-making bodies have to develop their outlooks in line with the potential threats to the country's national security. This would secure more efficient responses to the crises facing Egyptian politics.
*Deputy managing editor of Al-Siassa Al-Dawliya
samehrashed@gmail.com