The Arab regional system and its associations face two types of challenges. The first type is the structural challenges that emerge from the nature of the system and its associations, as well as the country members in this system. The second type is related to the changing conditions and the Arab ability in dealing with them. The emergence of the second Palestinian uprising (Intifada) was one of the main challenges of the second type that faced the Arab system in the last couple of years.
The challenges emerging from the system itself have become well known to everyone. They are summarized in the lack of effectiveness of the system, the lack of commitment to its decisions, and the lack of trust among it's members. In addition, the problems emerging from the nature of the member countries in the system themselves as they all face major problems in the fields of public organization, especially in issues concerning legitimacy, handling and transferring authority as well as approving the citizens' demands to determine their destiny. At the same time, most of the Arab societies suffer from the lack of achievements on the economical, scientific and technological levels. The weakness of the performance of the members reflects the weakness of the system itself, as the performance of the system is a final analysis of the result of the performance of its members.
The Arab system stumbles when dealing with structural problems, although it never really admitted it's inability in dealing with it. It continues to renew it's reform efforts from time to time, especially when it is faced, the system or its member stares, with pressures that it can't handle. Such pressures motivate a new round of reform efforts for the Arab regional system, hoping that reforming the system's associations will assist the member states in overcoming the problems they face. This means that the reform trials of the Arab system resulted from changes in the system's environment, especially those that threaten the interest or security of the member states.
The reform efforts were usually halted before they succeed in achieving real development in the performance levels of the system's associations. This could be as a result of the disappearance of the pressures that led to the initiation of the reform efforts, or due to the success of individual countries in rehabilitating or dealing with such pressures, which demotivates it from continuing the reform process of the system. This is especially true as solving the problems through reform efforts is a long term solution that doesn't yield results on the short run which makes the countries give up on the reform efforts.
Based upon such analysis, there are two stages in dealing with problems facing the Arab countries. In the first stage, the Arab countries resort to the Arab associations for assistance, and seeking to reform them to enable them to provide the needed assistance. This usually takes the form of increasing the members' commitment to the official rules, principals and ideologies for the Arab system and it's different associations. In the second stage, after the release of the pressures or the Arab countries success in dealing with them, the Arab countries desire for reform declines and returns to it's traditional methods.
The year 2001 witnessed a new trend of reform in the Arab regional system. It is a trend that came as a result of pressures on the international level as a result of the military confrontations between the Israeli forces and the Palestinians, as a result of the Palestinian Intifada.
First: The Arab System and the Intifada Challenge:
The Palestinian Intifada presents a challenge for the Arab regional system as it led to a more popular demand for the effective support of the Palestinians at a time when what the Arab states could provide is not satisfactory for the citizens. After years of compiled statements and Arab political announcements that had a negligible actual impact, this strategy became overused and useless. At the same time, many factors led to outlawing the option of an Arab Israeli war for the Palestinian cause. The Arab states together with the Arab system got stuck.
The Arab governments developed a strategy that works most of the times in dealing with the crisis at the instant of its explosion. This strategy depends basically on the traditional method of calling on the international community to interfere to stop the expansion of violence and instability to neighboring countries. Such violence could be a result of the popular sympathy with the Palestinian people and anger from the ineffectiveness of the Arab governments and international conspiracy with Israel. It could also be in the form of organized military confrontations between Israel and the Arab countries that could be forced to engage in a conflict to protect their legitimacy and existence, even if they know before hands that the result won't be on their side.
Yet, the increase in the Israeli coercion together with the length of the current wave of violence put the Arab system in a difficult situation that could not be dealt with through the traditional methods led to a widespread popular anger. In addition to Israel, the traditional target of the popular anger, a big part of this anger was directed to the United States, the main ally of Israel and the neutral Arab countries. This put the Arab countries that befriend the United States in an embarrassing situation as they were subject to popular demands of cutting the relations with the United States. This is a very big challenge for the Arab governments due to the centralization of the relations between these governments and Washington in many fields such as security, defense and economy.
In turn, many Arab government were also subject to popular anger that attacked their weak stance in dealing with the Israeli aggression, and they find themselves in place to contain popular riots and angry demonstrations.
The severity of the situation increased as a result of the impact of the Arab satellite channels. The second Palestinian uprising (Intifada) led to daily media surveillance that naturally concentrated on spotting the faults and weakness points. This increased the mobilization of the popular feelings against governments, and put them under additional pressures. This was very clear in the rapid superceded impact of the second Intifada. The confrontation between the Palestinians and the Israeli forces started after the Friday prayers on the 29th September 2000 after the visit of Sharon to the Aqsa Mosque accompanied by several thousand Israeli soldiers. On the 30th of the same month, demonstrations erupted in most of the Arab capital, and Muslim preachers started calling for Jihad. Such reaction could not have occurred with such speed without the major role of the satellite channels that carried the events to millions of Arab viewers across the Arab world.
Such a rapid reaction in itself constituted a major challenge for the Arab leadership, especially that the associations of the Arab regional system do not have the ability to rapidly interact with such events. In addition to what became well known as the late reaction of the main Arab associations, which is the Arab summit, this association is not designed to deal with crisis, but to deal with it's results. This means that after the crisis is over, or at least after passing the peak of the crisis and with the realization of it's results, it is easier to organize the interaction and predict the actions and reactions.
The Arab reaction to these developments is characterized by the emergence of two main trends. The first trend considered the Intifada and objection or a temporary explosion on the road of the negotiations that started with the Oslo agreement, and that it's result should be incorporated within the negotiations process. This stance was adopted by most of the Arab governments especially Egypt, Jordan, GCC and the states of the Arabian West. As for the minor trend, it considered the Intifada a development that halts the negotiations process, and allows a more strict Arab strategy in dealing with Israel and the US. This trend was adopted mainly by Syria, Iraq, Libya, Lebanon, and to some extent Yemen.
The sweeping popular reaction to the developments in the occupied territories took many forms, the most important of which is the call for an Arab Summit to take a united stance in the crisis. In other terms, the mere holding of a summit became a tool for dealing with the crisis. Hence, an emergency Arab summit was held on the 21st October 2000, a little more than three weeks after the eruption of the Intifada. This is considered a relatively rapid reaction from the Arab countries to the pressures and the demands resulting from the Intifada.
The Arab summit had two main tasks. The first, supporting the Palestinians uprising against the Israeli occupying forces. The second is regaining the credibility and confidence in the associations of the Arab system. In the stage of confrontations between the Palestinians and the occupying forces, the two tasks were closely related to each other. Achieving an effective level of support for the struggle of the Palestinians was the way to solve the problem of the lack of effectiveness and credibility that the Arab system associations are facing. The summit succeeded in partially providing the needed support for the Palestinians, in addition to the traditional means of condemnation. The summit discussed the issue of the Israeli boycott raised by some countries such as Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, but got limited support by other Arab countries, and at the end it was left for the countries that has relations with Israel to take their own decisions. The summit also discussed the issue of the financial Arab support where Saudi Arabia suggested 1 billion dollars, and was joined by other Gulf countries, which led to an Arab consensus.
The measures taken to support the Palestinians were below the accepted standard for the Arab population, and were not enough to fill the confidence and credibility gap. The summit needed to fill the gap between the real effectively level and the level demanded by the public opinion. Hence, the issue of reforming the timetable for holding the summit was brought up. The reform meant holding the summit one annually in each Arab country according to the alphabetical order. The timing for adopting this decision was related to the need of ensuring the seriousness of the Arab countries in dealing with the issues that face the Arab world, and raising the hope in improving the performance of the Arab associations gradually with the reform of the summit schedule. It seemed as if the Arab countries were releasing the pressure they fell under through promising a better performance in the future.
Second: The Amman Summit
According to the agreed summit schedule, the summit was held in the Jordanian capital on the 27th -28th March 2001, as the first scheduled summit. The political arena was divided into two trends. The first saw it necessary for the summit to discuss all the pressing issues, which makes it easy to benefit from the summit in issuing decrees for the main issues that arise throughout the year. The second trend saw it necessary for the summit to concentrate on one specific or the most urgent issue, so that the issued decree is well discussed and applicable.
It seemed that the Arab leaders decided to go with the first trend, which is practically a continuation of the system that has been followed in previous summits. As usual, the agenda for the summit and the issued decrees tackled many issues but the concentration was on one or limited number of issues. This is what happened in this summit as well. It concentrated on the issue of Palestine and the developments taking place in the occupied territories which was reflected in the title given to the first scheduled summit that was held in Amman, was called Al Quds Summit. This was very logical, especially after Ariel Sharon became the Israeli Prime Minister and how this affected the deteriorating conditions in the occupied territories.
The Arab leaders discussed many issues in the summit and the agenda included multiple economical, political, social and Arab cooperation foci. The final statement of the summit included three documents, as well as the conference decrees and the announcement of the Amman Summit. The final statement contained 52 articles. The summit issued 76 decrees regarding 17 issues. The announcement of the Amman Summit documented some situations in which a final agreement could not be reached.
First, the discussion in the political council concentrated on the methods to support the Intifada, such as reviving the Arab boycott, and the supporting financially, politically and media wise. It also discussed the means to support Lebanon, Somalia and the Comoros Islands, the Iranian occupation of the Emirates islands, lifting the sanctions of Sudan, the development of the Lukerby case, the Arab African cooperation, as well as the Iraq-Kuwait relations.
Second, the discussion in the economical council concentrated on the means to push Arab economical cooperation, the Egyptian initiative to hold the Arab Economical Conference in Cairo in November 2001, and the Arab cooperation in the field of IT and communications. It also discussed the preparation for the next summit and the Abu Zabi announcement concerning the future of the Arab environmental cooperation.
The Arab Israeli conflict and the Iraqi issue overlapped the results and was the main focus of attention of the summit. As for the Palestinian issue, the Arab leaders agreed to provide 240 million dollars urgent funds to support the budget of the Palestinian authority. They also assured the continuity of the political and monetary support for the struggle of the Palestinian people and their uprising (Intifada), and emphasized the importance of continuing to exert pressure on the security council and the general assembly of the United Nations to provide international protection for the Palestinians. The Arab leaders also announced their support for Lebanon's regaining the authority over its occupied territories and continuing to free the rest of its land occupied by Israel. It is clear that other than the decrees of financial support for the Intifada, which is a continuation of the decisions taken by the Summit held three months earlier in Cairo, the Amman scheduled summit abided by the same decisions traditionally taken in previous Arab summit concerning the Arab Israeli conflict.
The summit was close to reaching a great achievement on the Syrian Palestinian relations front especially from the side of President Bashar El Assad who announced in his speech that he is willing to turn the page of the past. Yet, the months that followed the summit and until the end of the year 2001 did not witness any development in this field. This was proved by the failure of both sides to implement Arafat's visit to Damascus that was scheduled many times.
Concerning Iraq, the summit gave the topic the title the Iraq- Kuwait situation. The Summit was close to reaching a great achievement as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia accepted the most important demand for Iraq, which is protecting the independence, sovereignty and unity of Iraq. They also accepted the halt of all activities and procedures that threaten its sovereignty or security, especially those conducted outside of the framework of the Security Council. Effort has been done to include this in the resolution, yet, the Iraqi accept the Kuwaiti demand to respect the safety and security of it's land and the Iraqi cooperation concerning the captured and the lost Kuwaitis lead to the failure of issuing the resolution. The Iraqi situation was disappointing, especially as Kuwait showed great flexibility when it dropped it's traditional demand of Iraqi apology for it's attack on Kuwait. In an attempt to ease the disappointment, King Abdullah the 2nd of Jordan was assigned to follow up on the file of the Iraq- Kuwait situation, which is an assignment that Kuwait opposed and was faced with an extreme Iraqi stance. The Kuwait opposition and the critical condition of this file led to lack of developments in the issue for the rest of the year.
In the field of social and economical cooperation, the activation of the Arab economical work was approved through holding an Arab Economical Conference in Cairo in November 2001. This conference supposedly aimed at increasing the Arab economical capabilities to benefit from the international economic developments, and presenting the opportunities available in the Arab regions to businessmen on the international level. It also aims at holding meetings between top Arab government officials and managers of the big Arab and international companies as well as businessmen as means to develop the relations and communication between the Arab countries and companies and the big international companies. The Arab leaders assigned the secretary general of the Arab league to take the necessary steps with Egypt to ensure the success of the conference and fulfilling its objectives.
The Arab leaders emphasized the necessity of an Arab Free Trade zone. Hence, they approved the immediate removal of non-tariff barriers as well as the administrative, financial and quality constraints, gradually decreasing all taxes and fees that have similar effects, giving the Arab products the same treatment as national products and minimizing the exceptions approved by the economical and social council according to the treaty of facilitating and developing the trade between Arab countries. This, in addition to minimizing the quantity of products subject to constraints in the list of agricultural products.
The Arab leaders emphasized their desire to move forward with the Arab economical cooperation through establishing the Arab Customs Union, solving the barriers of transportation between the Arab countries, and developing the Arab abilities in the field of communication and information technology. This is done through the league council's approval for the document of Arab Strategy for the Communication Society and Information Technology, establishing the Arab Information Technology Forum that depends on self funding, in addition to setting a plan for establishing and developing the communication and information networks in the Arab world. The summit also decided upon the framework of the Arab children rights.
The year ended without holding the agreed upon economical conference. Also, the Arab decision to rapid the establishment of the Arab Free Trade Zone was not reflected in the advancement rate in this field, which also applies to other decisions taken at the summit. It could be said that the periodical summit, although in itself is an indicator of taking Arab issues of concern seriously, did not lead to a higher level of effectiveness in dealing with such issues. But is this a result of the novelty of the experience? Only time will answer this question.
Second: Arab League Reform:
The Amman Summit approved the nomination of Amr Moussa as the secretary general of the Arab league. He official held the position on the 15th May 2001 as Dr. Esmat Abdel Meguid successor. The position was subject to nominations from many countries. Yemen announced its nomination for Dr. Mohsen El Ainy, the previous Prime Minister, Lebanon nominated Dr. Selim El Hoss the previous Prime Minister, Algeria nominated the famous diplomat Al Akhdar Al Ebrahimy, and Sudan nominated the previous President Abdel Rahman Siwar Al Thahab . The name of Prince Al Hassan Bin Talal, the previous crown prince of Jordan and the president of the Arab Thought Forum in Amman was also suggested for the post. Such announcements indicated much opposition for the performance of Dr. Essmat Abdel Meguid, and that many countries will not vote for re-electing him. As a result, Egypt nominated the Egyptian minister for foreign affairs Amr Moussa in confidence that this nomination will gain the Arab approval. In turn, this will enable Egypt to keep the tradition of the secretary general being from the nationality of the league's headquarter country. This is true as Egypt only lost this post when the headquarter was moved to Tunisia after Egypt signed the peace treaty with Israel in March 1979.
The nomination of Amr Moussa gained popular and official Arab approval rarely found for any issue, and maybe never gained by the nomination of previous Arab League secretary-generals. This lead to optimism regarding the role played by the new secretary general in developing the league by benefiting from the popular support and from his experience as Egypt's minister of foreign affairs for a long time as well as the popularity he enjoys from the Arab citizens and political powers.
From the minute of his election, the new secretary general confirmed his intention of developing the league and it's performance. On the 12th July 2001, which is only 2 month after holding the office, Mr. Amr Moussa announced his plan for developing the league which aims at making the league an effective regional organization that actually reflects the common objectives of it's 22 member states according to specific programs, strategies, plans and projects away from hopes and dreams. The reform plan suggested by Mr. Amr Moussa was based upon the following principals:
- Defining realistic objectives for the Arab cooperation through existing or new fields that match the general Arab interests and what is suggested on the international and regional fronts.
- Avoiding duplicity in missions which requires a full revision of the activities of the organizations, it's decisions, the degree of their implementation and the realistic possibility of the implementation.
- The planning of objectives and strategies should be associated with execution plans and specific funding. This means that each decision suggested by any council or meeting held within the framework of the Arab league should have specific financial budget that is presented before the draft decree itself.
- The system should be characterized with the flexibility that allows it to reformulate itself, it's objectives and programs whenever needed in light if the achieved success.
- Determining the responsibilities of the various branched of the Arab league in a clear and transparent framework. This facilitates the evaluation process of the objectives and revision of the execution programs designed for their implementation.
- Reconsidering the employment policies in the league and the organizations that follow it. Employment should be based on contracts for a specific period and qualifications. There should be a limit for the number of employees within the organization that is periodically evaluated.
Reform Factors:
1- Delegates: they should be chosen from significant characters in the Arab societies and are delegated the responsbility of working in the specific fields of the organizations framework. They acquire the title of Arab delegates and the unit that assists them is called the delegation. They are assigned specific missions and issues. A plan was suggested of employing eight delegates, and hence, establish eight delegation:
- The civil delegation: concerned with the issues of women, children, human rights and civil society organizations.
- Economical delegations: concerned with the Arab common market and the related issues.
- Cultural and educational delegation: concerned with the civilizations dialogue, coordinating educational programs and Arab cultural activities.
- Arab immigrant delegation: concerned with the Arab communities in other countries, identifying their needs and connecting them to the homeland.
- Arab media delegation: concerned with presenting the league's stance on Arab political issues through coordination with the member states and related organizations.
- Political and International Relations delegation: supports the Arab Mediterranean relations with Europe, Africa, the US, Asia and neighboring countries, as well as other political international and regional organizations. It is also concerned with the issues of disarmament and regional security.
- Jerusalem Affairs delegation: concerned with the various sides of the case and the coordination regarding this issue on the Arab, Muslim and international levels.
2- The League's Envoys: they are selected from the Arab professional personalities to follow up on specific cases for specific time periods, which is similarly done in the UN and EU.
3- Secretary General Representatives: nominated by the Secretary General from among Arab professional personalities to fulfill or follow up on specific missions.
4- Secretary General Representatives: adding the post of Deputy Secretary General in the future is being studied so that in the first stage, he is nominated from the assisting secretaries, and supervises the general secretary and it's external offices. He will also be responsible about resolving Arab conflicts.
5- New Departments: they will be supervised by assisting secretaries concerned with work organization. In addition, there will be an assisting secretary responsible for preparing for the annual summit, the last ministerial council and such.
According to this vision of Arab League reform, the Secretary General suggested the following structure for the league:
- General Secretary: includes delegates, envoys and secretary assistants.
- The specialized ministerial councils.
- The specialized Arab organizations.
- The various Arab Unions.
- The Arab NGOs: within the framework of coordination and guidance.
It is noticed that the reform plan did not introduce reform techniques in important issues such as avoiding duplicity in the work of the Arab organizations that follow the league and how they should coordinate with each other. It has not presented a complete vision for dealing with the current financial crisis of the league, with the exception of the suggestion regarding reconsidering the employment in different departments in the league and relating the suggestion of programs with finding the necessary funds. In addition, the plan was inspired from the European experience. This made it subject to strong criticism, especially that the EU has reached an advanced stage of institutional organization that enables it to successfully employ techniques such as envoys and delegates. They who granted large liabilities that are hard to achieve in the current condition of the Arab framework.
Within the framework of implementing this plan, three delegates have actually been appointed. The first, Dr. Hanan Ashrawi as the media delegate. The second is Dr. Ahmed Kamal Abu El Magd as the delegate for culture, education and civilizations' dialogue. The third is Mr. Taher El Masry, the previous Jordanian Prime Minister, as the delegate for civil society affairs. The Secretary General has also announced the halt of appointments and that any new appointments will be contract based to cut down costs.
Until the end of the year, none of the appointed delegates have practiced tangibly any of their assigned missions. Also, the appointment of delegates has been halted, maybe due to the weak results of the first stage. In addition, no significant difference was observed neither in the performance of the specialized Arab organizations nor in the preparation for the following Arab summit. This led to the lack of significant difference in the performance of the Arab League during the first year of implementing the reform plan. It should be put in consideration that the period from the middle to the end of the year does not provide a full experiment that can be used as a basis for a full evaluation. Hence, the experience should be given a longer period of time before evaluating it. Yet, the nature of the problems that the Arab world suffers from and the limitations of the role of the Secretary General according to the charter of the Arab League are all demotivating factors.
The most important real achievement of the Arab League in the era of the new Secretary General is the holding of the Civilizations' Dialogue conference. The conference was held to face the claims of conflict of civilizations, and to correct the image taken about the Arabs and Muslims after the September 11 attacks. The Secretary General called for the preparation for this conference within the framework of his reform plan. This conference, which gathered Arab intellectuals under the umbrella of the Arab League for the first time, aimed at setting an Arab strategy for dealing with the western attempts to deform the image of Arabs and Muslims. It also aimed at setting the strategy for showing the real face of the Arab and Muslim civilization that rejects violence and terrorism, and that calls for tolerance and dialogue. The conference was held on the 26th November under the title Civilizations' Dialogue: continuity not conflict.
During the sessions, 40 researches presented by the participants in the conference were discussed. They practically presented the personal perspectives for the Arab crisis after the September 11 attacks from one side and their visions regarding how to deal with this new situation. In addition, the general secretary of the League prepared a detailed research on how to face that deformation campaign launched against the Arab culture and Islamic civilization, the role that should be played by the Arab intellectuals. It also addressed the means of coordination between the League and the international, regional, Islamic and civil society organizations, as well as research centers. The objective was to end up with a work plan that could be immediately implemented, and that is presented to the Arab countries before presenting it to the Summit to be held in Beirut.
At the end of the conference, two documents were issued. The first is the announcement of the Arab intellectuals gathering. It included several recommendations, the most important of which are:
- Assuring the terrorism is an international phenomenon that is rejected regardless of it's source or objectives. Hence, the Arab intellectuals convicted the September 11 attacks.
- The support for the Arab communities in other countries and their activities. The conference assigned the Secretary General the mission to follow up on this issue.
- Extremism and violence are results of certain social, economical, cultural and political problems on the external and internal levels. It was nourished by the Israeli aggression, it's opposition to a peaceful and fair settlement for the Arab Israeli conflict, it's rejection to admit the right of the Palestinians to establish their independent states, its continuation in occupying Arab territories and violation of international legitimacy resolutions.
- Warning from the mix up between the internationally rejected terrorism and the legitimate resistance against occupation.
- Generalizing the culture of peace and justice, which prevents the eruption of conflicts. This demands the settlement of existing international conflicts as well as the Arab Israeli conflict in a balanced and fair way according to the international legitimacy.
- Protecting the Arab culture, refusing the deformation of the Islamic principals that calls for equality, justice and tolerance, assuring the necessity of dialogue and intellectual pluralism and calling for the Arab research centers to play their role effectively.
- The necessity of mutual acceptance of the Islamic and western civilizations based upon mutual respect and appreciation for the political and economical interests of both of them.
- Assuring that we the Arabs -Muslims and Christians- seek to cooperate with all human civilizations and emphasize maximizing the common factors and minimizing the differences, as well as peaceful settlement of disputes.
The second document issued by the conference is titled the guidance program for civilizations' dialogue. It includes many suggestions on the Arab and international levels. The most important of these suggestions are:
- Supporting international centers related to Arab issues.
- Holding periodical common joint seminars for Arab and international intellectuals in Arab and international capitals.
- Publishing the outcome of these seminars in Arab and foreign languages in coordination with research institutes and Arab intellectual forums.
- Organizing Arab cultural exhibitions that tour the world.
- Establishing and funding programs in the academic institutions and universities worldwide.
- Motivating the exchange between Arab and international professors and researchers and planning exchange programs of studies.
- Concentrating on the cultural speech within Arab and Muslim communities to emphasize the sense of pride and belonging to the Arab identity while interacting with different cultures and civilizations.
- Calling on the governments to prepare a new generation of preachers who understand the real Muslim values of tolerance that reject extremism.
- Calling for the Arab Organization for Education, Culture and Science to reach an agreement between Arab countries to prepare educational curriculum from different educational levels about the different cultures and civilizations. This aims at creating awareness and understanding of other communities.
- Supporting the role of the civil society organizations and Arab NGOs concerned with developing cultural and educational concepts that lead to understanding and dialogue between civilizations.
The conference's recommendation for establishing the fund for conflict of civilizations was implemented. It aims at providing the necessary funding for implementing the activities and programs suggested by the participants of the conference. Such activities were included in the program for facing the deformation of the image of Muslims and Arabs.
Holding the conference is considered a success for the league. On the other hand, moving on to the implementation of the suggestions and plans issued by the conference has not proceeded yet. It is important to point out that the success of the conference and the possibility of implementing its recommendations show the ability of the league to activate its role in specific nonpolitical fields. In turn, this can be used as a seed to activate its political role.